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COMMENT 
A PIG IN THE PARLOR:1 AN EXAMINATION 
OF LEGISLATION DIRECTED AT OBSCENITY 
AND INDECENCY ON THE INTERNET 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hailed as the modem Athenian forum of free discourse,2 
the Internee currently faces a crucial challenge to the very 
1. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926). 
2. See ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET - USER'S GUIDE & CATALOG, O'Reilly 
& Assoc., Inc., 2d. Ed. 1994; EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE 
AND THE LAw: YOUR RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE ON-LINE WORLD (1994). 
3. [d. Technically, the Internet is the global network that connects many 
smaller, individual networks. A network is established by linking two or more 
computers to each other, enabling them to communicate. To establish a linkage 
with other computers and become part of a network, a user needs only a comput-
er, access to standard telephone lines, and a modem through which his computer 
connects to others via the telephone lines. Once a connection is established, a user 
can communicate with as many other users as are part of that particular network. 
Generally, individual computers become members of a larger network community, 
interacting through a central nucleus. These central nuclei are either large com-
mercial online providers (i.e., CompuServe, America Online, and Prodigy,) or small-
er, individualized networks known as Bulletin Board Systems (hereinafter "BBS.") 
The operator of a BBS links individual users to one another through a "host" 
computer, establishing a community of like-minded users. This "host" computer 
stores the information transmitted by the individual in its memory banks, and 
provides access to other users attempting to obtain that information. Communica-
tion in the established online community occurs through one of the three following 
methods: (1) Internet Relay Chat, or "IRC," which allows users to communicate in 
"real-time" with other users logged on at the same time, taking on the characteris-
tics of an actual conversation covering a specified topic or interest; (2) File Trans-
fer Protocol, or "FTP," which enables transferring, or uploading and downloading, 
of flIes of information or software from one computer to another; and (3) Electronic 
Mail, or "E:mail," which allows users to send "letters" or postings to other users. 
[d. 
599 
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premise on which it is based. For although the Internet arose 
from free speech ideals,4 members of the United States Con-
gress have overwhelmingly supported legislation that restricts 
Internet users who transmit material Congress deems ."ob-
scene" or "indecent."s While the stated goal of such legislation 
is to protect minors who use the Internet from exposure to 
obscene material,6 this legislation, as written, imposes a stan-
dard which is incongruous with the nature of the Internet as a 
communication system.7 
The Internet, or ARPAnet, 8 was originally developed by 
the U.S. Defense Department to support military research.9 As 
academics were invited to use the system, word of the system's 
research utility quickly spread. 10 As the popularity of the com-
puter increased, public consumer demand for access to the 
Internet increased. ll Consequently, the Internet quickly be-
came a household word, no longer confined to government or 
academic circles. 12 Currently, the Internet accommodates 20 
million users, and the numbers increase daily.13 
In light of the expanse and growing importance of the 
Internet, this Comment will discuss the history and application 
of obscenity laws.14 This Comment will then discuss how ob-
scenity and indecenecy laws apply to content transmitted over 
various interactive mediums, particularly the Internet. Is Fi-
4. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 
1995, at 38, 45; Regulation of On-line Services, NEW YORK LAw JOURNAL, August 
22, 1995, at 3. 
5. Edmund L. Andrews, Senate Supports Severe Penalties on Computer Smut, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1995, at AI, 06. 
6. 140 CONGo REC. S9745, S9746 (daily ed. July 20, 1994) (statement by Sen. 
Exon). 
7. See infra notes 122-53 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
8. ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET - USER'S GUIDE & CATALOG, 15, O'Reilly 
& Assoc., Inc., 2d. Ed. 1994. 
9. Id. at 13. (The United States Defense Department sought to establish a 
computer communications network which would have the ability to function in the 
aftermath of a large scale bomb attack.) 
10. See Id. at 13-15. 
11. David Wallechinsky, Be At Home on the Internet, SUNDAY EXAMINER & 
CHRONICLE PARADE, November 19, 1995, at 6. 
12. See Id. 
13. Id. 
14. See infra notes 17·69 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
15. See infra notes 112-60 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
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nally, this Comment will conclude with recommendations for 
fashioning legislation that limits access to undesirable materi-
al to minors, while maintaining the freedom for consenting 
adults to access such material.16 
II. BACKGROUND 
Material transmitted through interactive communication 
mediums is subject to regulation under case law interpreting 
the First Amendmene7 and by statutes enacted under Con-
gressional regulatory powers. IS Obscene material has histori-
cally been subjected to statutory prohibition and does not re-
ceive First Amendment protection.19 However, indecent mate-
rial that does not rise to the level of obscenity is protected 
under the First Amendment, albeit to a limited degree.2o 
A. OBSCENITY UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The guarantees of freedom of expression and freedom of 
the press are found in the First Amendment to the Constitu-
tion of the United States.21 The First Amendment provides, in 
relevant part, that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging 
the freedom of speech, or of the press. »22 The Framers of the 
Constitution fashioned the First Amendment's protection of 
free speech and press to ensure the continual exchange of 
political ideas and social sentiment.23 The First Continental 
16. See infra notes 161-91 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. I, and infra pp. 22-68 and accompanying text for 
further discussion. 
ld. 
18. U.S. CONST. art.!. 
19. 8.ee infra notes 21-69 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
20. See infra notes 70-84 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
21. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
22. ld. The First Amendment provides: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances. 
23. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). (The Supreme Court af-
flrmed the conviction of petitioner for mailing obscene material through the U.S. 
Postal Service, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461.) 
3
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Congress stated that: 
The importance of this [freedom of the press] 
consists, besides the advancement of truth, sci-
ence, morality, and arts in general, in its diffu-
sion of liberal sentiments on the administration 
of Government, its ready communication of 
thoughts between subjects, and its consequential 
promotion of union among them, whereby op-
pressive officers are shamed or intimidated, into 
more honourable and just modes of conducting 
affairs. 24 
Justice Holmes further defined the underlying rationale for 
protecting freedom of expression as ensuring "free trade in 
ideas," stressing that society must have access to all opinions, 
favorable or unfavorable, thereby permitting individual 
choice.25 
However, as the Supreme Court often reiterates, the guar-
antee of freedom of expression is not absolute. 26 Historically, 
the Supreme Court has acknowledged Congress' power to 
abridge certain "categories" of expression which it finds harm-
ful, of no redeeming value, or which cannot be mitigated by 
further speech.27 Such "categories" of expression do not de-
24. [d. at 484 (citing 1 Journals of the Continental Congress 108 (1774». 
25. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting) 
(mBjority of the Court upheld petitioners convictions under the 1917 espionage Act, 
which prohibited advocating anti-war sentiment with the intent to disrupt the 
United States' involvement in World War I.) 
26. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (Supreme Court upheld 
petitioner's conviction under local ordinance prohibiting door-to-door commercial 
solicitations without prior homeowner approval;) See Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 
315 (1951) (Supreme Court upheld petitioner's conviction for disorderly conduct. 
Petitioner delivered an inflammatory street-comer speech. Certain members of the 
crowd warned the police of a violent reaction. Petitioner was arrested after refus-
ing police requests to stop the speech due to concern of violence;) See Chaplinsky 
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (Supreme Court upheld petitioner's convic-
tion under a statute which made it unlawful to address another in public with 
"fighting words," words likely to cause the average person to fight;) Schenck u. 
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (defendants sent two draftees a document in 
opposition of the draft and urging that they not participate. Defendants were 
charged with conspiring to violate the 1917 Espionage Act, making it a crime to 
incite or attempt to incite insubordination in the U.S. military forces.) 
27. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572. In Chaplinsky, the Court set forth the list of 
categories of expressions which traditionally have not received First Amendment 
protection. unprotected expressions include: advocacy of imminent lawless behavior 
4
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serve First Amendment protections and are considered to be of 
less social value because they infringe upon other rights.28 
Where expression falls within an unprotected category, the 
Supreme Court has interpreted the First Amendment as allow-
ing for abridgement premised on the communicative impact of 
the expression.29 
1. Obscenity as Unprotected Expression 
Since the holding in Commonwealth v. Sharpless30 in 
1815, the American judicial system has consistently held that 
obscenity falls outside the protection of the First Amend-
mene1 because it lacks any social value or importance.32 
Based on such characterization, obscenity has also been statu-
torily prohibited by federal and state legislatures since 1868.33 
In response to constitutional challenges against such statutes, 
the Supreme Court has proffered three reasons for upholding 
laws that prohibit obscenity: 
(1) "An arguable correlation between exposure to 
obscene material and crime;" (2) The power of 
(Schenck, 249 U.S. 47); "fighting words" (Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572); obscenity 
(Roth, 354 U.S. 476); and libelous utterances (Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 
(1952». 
28. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 484, wherein Justice Brennan stated "[A]ll ideas 
having even the slightest redeeming social importance - unorthodox ideas, contro-
versial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion - have the 
full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the 
limited area of more important interests. [d. 
29. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
30. 2 S.R. 91 (1815). (Conviction at common-law premised upon the exhibition, 
for profit, of a nude picture). 
31. See infra notes 32-69 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
32. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (vacating and remanding 
petitioner's conviction for utilizing the postal service for disseminating obscene 
material. Petitioner was convicted under California Penal Code § 311.2, for the 
mass mailing of "adult" material to people whom had not requested such mate-
rial); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (reversing the adjudication of 
petitioners book as obscene); Roth, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (affirming the conviction of 
petitioner for utilizing the postal service for the dissemination of obscene literature 
and advertisements). 
33. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 12-16, at 906 (2d 
ed. 1988). (Hereinafter "TRIBE") New York enacted the first statute criminalizing 
obscenity in 1868, as a result of intense lobbying efforts of Anthony Comstock and 
other protestant leaders. Congress eventually followed suit, enacting the first feder-
al anti-obscenity law in 1873. [d. 
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the states "to make morally neutral judgments" 
that public exhibition of obscene material, or 
commerce in the obscene, tends to "injure the 
community as a whole" by polluting the "public 
environment"; and (3) The deleterious effect that 
obscene material has upon the public, because 
"what is commonly read and seen and heard and 
done intrudes upon us all, want it or not."34 
By articulating the purposes behind statutory prohibitions 
against obscenity, the Supreme Court has clearly held that the 
legislature's strong interest in protecting the morals of its 
citizens permits the suppression of obscene materia1.35 
One of the primary legislative motives for prohibiting 
obscene expression has been a concern for minors.36 A state 
has a recognized compelling interest in ensuring the health, 
safety, welfare and moral development of the children within 
its jurisdiction.37 Clearly, a state may control the conduct of 
children even if it cannot control the same type of behavior if 
engaged in by an adult.3s Accordingly, the regulation of mate-
rial made available to children constitutes a supervening state 
interest.39 
The Supreme Court has articulated two interests that 
justify the regulation of material accessible to children: (1) the 
basic societal interest40 in aiding parents in the performance 
of their parental duties41 and (2) the independent state inter-
34. [d. at 917 (quoting from Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58-
60 (1973». In Paris Adult Theatre, the Court upheld a Georgia ban on exhibition 
of "adult fIlms" for purpose of avoiding anticipated crime. Held that a legislature 
may determine, even in the absence of conclusive evidence, that antisocial conduct 
will be an inevitable result of exposure to obscenity. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. 
at 59-61. 
35. [d. 
36. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
37. [d. at 638. 
38. [d. "[T]he power of the state to control the conduct of children reaches 
beyond the scope of its authority over adults. . .. " [d. (quoting from Prince v. 
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, (1944». 
39. [d. at note 6 (quoting from Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 72 YALE L. J. 877, 938-939 (1963». 
40. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639. 
41. [d. 
6
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est in the "well-being of its youth."42 Therefore, states may 
regulate obscene material43 to ensure the healthy intellectual 
and moral development of its youth." 
Since 1815/5 courts have struggled to apply obscenity 
statutes to the content of communication that legislatures seek 
to restrain.46 The Supreme Court has devised numerous tests 
and standards to define that which constitutes obscene expres-
sion. The first standard for detennining whether material is 
obscene was established in the English case of Regina v. 
Hicklin, which was subsequently adopted by American 
COurtS.47 The Regina court defined obscene material as that 
which tends to "deprave and corrupt those whose minds are 
open to such immoral influences.,,48 However, later courts 
found that the Regina test reached further than desired after 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
refused to apply it to the renowned novel, Ulysses.49 
The Supreme Court established the next obscenity test in 
Roth v. United States.50 In Roth, the Court held that an ex-
pression was obscene if, as a whole, it appealed to prurient 
interests.51 The court defined "prurient" as "material having a 
tendency to excite lustful thoughts"52 or that which provokes 
an "itching, morbid, or lascivious longing.,,53 The Roth court 
42. [d. at 640. 
43. See infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
44. See Ginsberg, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
45. See supra note 30 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
46. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. 49, 99 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
47. L.R. 3 Q.B. 360 (1868). 
48. [d. at 368. 
49. United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses", 5 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 
1933), affd 72 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1934) (District Court held that James Joyce's 
novel, Ulysses, was not obscene. The novel is a day-in-the-life depiction of city 
dwellers in Dublin, in which Joyce explored the thoughts and mental imagery of 
his characters. The United States government charged that the novel was obscene 
due to the language and apparent pre-occupation of the characters with sexual 
matters.) [d. 
50. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
51. [d. at 487. 
52. [d. at 487 note 20. 
53. [d. 
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did, however, emphasize that First Amendment protection 
extends to ideas having even the "slightest redeeming social 
value.,,54 
The Supreme Court later incorporated the "slightest re-
deeming social value" language into the obscenity test in A 
Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" 
v. Attorney General of Massachusetts. 55 In Memoirs, the Court 
held that the work must be shown to be utterly without re-
deeming social value" before it may be judged obscene. 56 How-
ever, due to the practically insurmountable burden such a 
formulation placed upon the prosecution, the Court found that 
the Memoirs criteria for judging obscenity was impractical in 
its application. 57 
2. The Miller Test and the Notion of Community Standards 
Presently, the Supreme Court follows the standard set 
forth in Miller v. California.58 Under Miller, the Court weighs 
the following factors to determine whether an expression is 
obscene: 
(a) Whether the average person, applying con-
temporary community standards, would find 
that the material, taken as a whole, appeals to 
the prurient interest; (b) Whether the material 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, 
sexual conduct specifically defined by the appli-
cable state law; and (c) Whether the work, taken 
as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value. 59 
In contrast to Memoirs,60 therefore, the Miller test holds that 
54. [d. at 484. 
55. 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). In Memoirs, the Massachusetts Supreme Court 
upheld a lower court's adjudication of the book as obscene, holding that a patently 
offensive book which appeals to prurient interest need not be unqualifiedly worth-
less before it can be deemed obscene. The Supreme Court affirmed. 
56. [d. 
57. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, at 21-22 (1973). 
58. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
59. [d. at 24. 
60. 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). 
8
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an expression may be obscene even if not utterly lacking in 
redeeming social value.61 
The Miller court provided a detailed definition of what 
might constitute "patently offensive" material. The Court stat-
ed that material will be deemed patently offensive if it repre-
sents or depicts ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, 
actual or simulated; masturbation; excretory functions; or lewd 
exhibition of the genitals.62 Hence, for an obscenity statute to 
survive constitutional challenge, Miller held that a statute 
must clearly define that which is patently offensive.63 
However, the Miller court acknowledged that the concept 
of patently offensive material varies from community to com-
munity.64 The Court rejected the notion of a uniform, national 
standard when applying the "contemporary community stan-
dards" facet of the Miller test.65 The Supreme Court reasoned 
that an umbrella standard would: (1) subject some communi-
ties to expressions which they found entirely offensive; or (2) 
suppress that expression which might be acceptable in other 
communities.66 However, when applying the community stan-
dard facet of the Miller test, The Supreme Court has held that 
jurors are to draw from their own knowledge of what is accept-
able on either a local, statewide, or to a limited degree, a na-
tional level. 67 
Since obscene material is often distributed from one com-
munity and received in another, the Supreme Court addressed 
the potential for conflicting community standards in Hamling 
v. United States.68 In Hamling, the Court held that an obscen-
61. TRIBE, supra note 42, at 909. 
62. Miller, 413 U.S. at 25. 
63. See Id. 
64. Id. at 30. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. at 32 note 13. "In terms of danger to free expression, the potential for 
suppression seems at least as great in application of a single nationwide standard 
as in allowing distribution in accordance with local tastes." Id. 
67. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-5 (1974). The Court held that 
it is not unconstitutional for a jury to draw on its beliefs as to how the nation, as 
an all-encompassing community, would view the expressions charged as obscene in 
making their determination on that question. 
68. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). In Hamling, postal patrons received a sexually explicit 
9
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ity statute will not be struck down as unconstitutional merely 
because the expression may be subjected to differing communi-
ty standards in determining whether it is obscene.69 There-
fore, the transmitter of obscene material may be subject to 
prosecution in a community that holds a more strict standard 
regarding obscene material. This is so even though the commu-
nity from which a person transmits the material may not con-
sider the material as "patently offensive" or as something less 
than obscene. 
B. REGULATION OF INDECENT SPEECH UNDER THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
Where material is not "patently offensive under the rele-
vant contemporary community standards," such material "may 
be deemed indecent rather than obscene."7o Indecent material, 
unlike obscene material, is a protected form of speech.71 The 
Supreme Court has defined indecent expressions as those 
which fail to conform with accepted standards of morality. 72 
brochure at a post office box in San Diego, which falls within the federal jurisdic-
tion of the Southern District of California. The brochures were deposited in the 
mail by petitioners in North Hollywood, California, a part of the federal jurisdic-
tion of the Central District of California. Petitioners were tried and convicted in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of California by a jury, 
composed of persons from within the federal jurisdiction of the Southern District of 
California, for the mailing of an obscene advertising brochure with sexually explicit 
material in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1461. 
69. Id. at 106. "The fact that distributors of allegedly obscene material may be 
subjected to varying community standards in the various federal judicial districts 
into which they transmit the materials does not render a federal statute unconsti-
tutional because of the failure of application of uniform national standards of ob-
scenity." Id. 
70. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
In Action for Children's Television, petitioners challenged section 16(a) of the Pub-
lic Telecommunication Act of 1992 which would have restricted commercial broad-
casting of indecent programming to the hours between midnight and 6:00 a.m. The 
Court of Appeals remanded the case to the FCC with instructions to more narrow-
ly tailor its provision. Id. at 656. 
71. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). In Cohen, the Supreme Court 
reversed appellant's conviction for wearing a jacket bearing the pronouncement 
"Fuck the Draft" in a courthouse. Id. 
72. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978). In FCC, the Federal Communi-
cations Commission (hereinafter "FCC") sanctioned a radio station for broadcasting 
an indecent program at a time of day when children were particularly apt to be 
listening. The radio station had broadcast George Carlin's infamous "Seven Dirty 
Words" monologue. The Supreme Court upheld the FCC's power to regulate the 
10
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Although offensive in nature, such material posits ideas which 
have been held to contain political or social value, however 
slight.73 
1. Limitations on Freedom of Expression: The Captive 
Audience Doctrine 
While certain types of expression are protected under the 
First Amendment, a counter-balance generally exists to the 
indiscriminate exercise of that right.74 Despite falling within 
the protections afforded by the First Amendment, indecent 
material is subject to regulation due to its "slight social val-
ue.,,75 Where exercise of one's freedom of expression unduly 
encroaches upon other rights, invariably one must be compro-
mised.76 If a member of the community is subjected to an ex-
pression which he would sooner avoid and is unable to avert 
his attention from its source, that person becomes a captive 
audience to such expression.77 Therefore, based on the concept 
of captive audience, a statute may regulate the context within 
which an unavoidable expression is made.78 
Expression may be regulated under the captive audience 
doctrine "only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the 
home or the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the 
unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.,,79 Therefore, if 
the viewer can avoid the disagreeable expression, the person 
exercising his or her First Amendment rights will prevai1.80 
time during which such an ndecent program may be aired. 1d. 
73. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25 (wherein Justice Harlan declared that "[O]ne man's 
vulgarity is another's lyric.") 1d. 
74. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-303 (1974). 
75. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 746 (quoting Chaplinsky u. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 
568, 572 (1942». 
76.1d. 
77. 1d at 302 (citing Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 
(1952) Douglas, J., dissenting». 
78. 1d. at 302. 
79. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (emphasis add-
ed). 
80. 1d. at 210-211 (quoting Cohen u. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)). "[T]he 
burden normally falls upon the viewer to avoid further bombardment of [his) sen-
sibilities simply by averting [his] eyes." [d. 
11
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2. Time, Place, or Manner Regulation of Indecent Speech 
In FCC v. Pacifica, the Supreme Court held that regula-
tion of indecent material is justified when it prevents 
children's exposure to offensive expressions.s1 Analogizing in-
decent material to subjecting a captive audience to a nuisance, 
the Supreme Court held that communities may regulate inde-
cent material with respect to the time, place, or manner of its 
transmission.s2 However, in promulgating a time, place, or 
manner regulation affecting protected speech, legislatures 
must narrowly tailor the regulation to serve the government's 
legitimate, content-neutral interests.s3 For a statute to regu-
late indecent material, the regulation must be narrowly tai-
lored to serve the government's purpose of preventing exposure 
to minors or unwilling recipients.s4 
C. FEDERAL STATUTORY REGULATION OF EXPRESSION 
TRANSMITTED VIA COMMUNICATIVE MEDIUMS: THE 
COMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1934 
With the advent of new technologies, Congress continually 
confronts the issue of how to balance the right to freedom of 
expression with the right to enjoy the benefits of increasingly 
pervasive technological mediums.s5 As the opportunity to en-
gage in free expression increases with the growth of telecom-
munication mediums, legislatures and courts must find a way 
to balance existing limitations on freedom of expression with 
new technology. 
Congress recognized the need to regulate speech activity 
occurring through telecommunications mediums in passing the 
81. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732. 
82. See Id. at 750. 
83. Ward v. Rock, 491 U.S. 781, 798 (1989). In Ward, New York City passed a 
sound-amplification guideline to regulate the volume of performances held in a 
public park. The Supreme Court upheld the city's guideline, holding that it was 
narrowly tailored to serve the city's legitimate interest in protecting the interests 
of other users of the park. Id. 
84. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
85. See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communications 
Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, at 119-20 (1989). 
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Communications Act of 1934.86 47 U.S.C. § 15187 Chapter 5 
of the Communications Act covers the regulation of wire or 
radio communication.88 The stated legislative purpose for en-
acting Chapter 5 of Title 47 is: 
[T]o make available, so far as possible, to all the 
people of the United States a rapid, efficient, 
Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio 
communication service with adequate facilities 
at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the 
national defense, for the purpose of promoting 
safety of life and property through the use of 
wire and radio communication ... 89 
In order to execute the provisions of Chapter 5 of Title 47 and 
"safeguard the public interest," with respect to wire communi-
cations,90 Congress established the Federal Communications 
Commission (hereinafter "FCC").91 "[C]ommunications by 
wire" include, but are not limited to,: 
[T]ransmission of writings, signs, signals, pic-
tures, and sounds of all kinds by aid of wire, 
cable, or other like connection between the 
points of origin and reception of such transmis-
sion, including all instrumentalities, facilities, 
apparatus, and services (among other things, the 
receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communica-
tions) incidental to such transmission.92 
Therefore, the FCC has a broad legislative mandate to insti-
tute and enforce rules and regulations affecting wire 
transmissions as it deems necessary.93 
86. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). 
Congress premised its authority to regulate the communications industry upon the 
Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the United States. 
87. Id. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause pro-
vides that "Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce . . . among the 
several states." Id. 
88. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1988). 
89. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). 
90. National Cable Television Assoc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 341 
(1974); 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). 
91. Id. 
92. 47 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1988). 
93. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). 
13
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1. Regulation of Content in Telephone Communications Under 
Title 47 
Given the strong Congressional position that obscenity is 
"injurious to public morals,'>94 Congress applied existing ob-
scenity restrictions to telecommunication devices.95 One such 
targeted medium was the telephone.96 Because communica-
tion over the telephone constitutes a "communication by wire," 
Chapter 5 of Title 47 explicitly includes the telephone within 
the confines of the Communications Act.97 
Section 223(a) of Title 47 provides, in relevant part, that 
any statement made over the telephone that is "obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, or indecent" subjects the maker of such state-
ment to criminal prosecution, which can result in a significant 
jail sentence, a costly fine, or both.98 Additionally, Section 
223(b)(2) subjects the owner of a telephone facility providing 
"indecent communications" to anyone under eighteen years of 
age, or to an unconsenting recipient, to a significant jail term, 
a costly fine, or both.99 
Id. 
Id. 
94. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948). 
95. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1988). 
96. Id. 
97. See supra note 92 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
98. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (1988). 
Whoever - (1) in the District of Columbia or in interstate 
or foreign communications by means of telephone - (A) 
makes any comment, request, suggestion or proposal 
which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy or indecent; ... 
or (2) knowingly permits any telephone facility under his 
control to be used for any purpose prohibited by this 
section, shall be fined not more than $50,000 or impris-
oned not more than six months, or both. 
99. 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)(2). 
Whoever knowingly - (A) within the United States, by 
means of telephone, makes (directly or by recording de-
vice) any indecent communication for commercial purposes 
which is available to any person under 18 years of age or 
to any other person without that person's consent, regard-
less of whether the maker of such communication placed 
the call; or (B) permits any telephone facility under such 
person's control to be used for an activity prohibited by 
subparagraph (A), shall be fined not more than $50,000 or 
imprisoned not more than six months, or both. 
14
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2. Amendments to Title 47 U.S.C. 223 
In response to vast changes within the telecommunications 
industry, Congress has recently focused on updating and 
amending The Communications Act of 1934.100 In 1994, the 
Committee on Commerce drafted an amendment to the Act 
designed to restrict obscene and indecent expressions on the 
Internet. lOl Specifically, Senator James Exon of Nebraska 
submitted an amendment to Section 223 of Title 47 which 
substituted the phrase "telecommunications device" for the 
word "telephone," thereby expanding the language of the stat-
ute to encompass communication by computers.102 
Presenting his proposed amendment to the Commerce 
Committee, Senator Exon indicated that the purpose of his 
proposed "Communications Decency Act," was to "assure that 
the information highway does not turn into a red light dis-
trict."103 In addition, Senator Exon declared that his amend-
ment would protect children from obscene, lewd, or indecent 
messages.104 Senator Exon's proposed Amendment, however, 
received no Congressional attention outside of the Commerce 
Committee during the 103rd Congressional Term.105 
In 1995, Senator Exon proposed a revised version of the 
"Communications Decency Act,"106 reiterating that the funda-
mental purpose of the amendment was to provide much-needed 
protection for children. 107 On June 14, 1995, the Senate incor-
porated the Communications Decency Act into the larger Tele-
communications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1995 by 
a vote of 84 to 16.108 
100. 140 CONGo REC. 89745, 89746 (daily ed. July 20, 1994) (statement of 8en. 
Exon). 
101. ld. 
102. ld. The amendment also added the phrase "makes, transmits, or otherwise 
makes available" obscene or indecent communications. In addition, 8enator Exon's 
proposed amendment increased the fines from $50,000 to $100,000, and the length 
of imprisonment from six months to two years. ld. 
103. ld. at S9746. 
104. ld. 
105. 141 CONGo REc. S8087 (daily ed. June 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon). 
106. 141 CONGo REC. S8120 (daily ed. June 5, 1995). 
107. 141 CONGo REC. 88087 (daily ed. June 5, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon). 
108. 141 CONGo REC. 88310, 88329 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. 
15
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On June 15, 1995, the United States Senate overwhelm-
ingly approved the Telecommunications Act, containing Sena-
tor Exon's amended provisions. 109 Following months of negoti-
ations within the House of Representatives, the Telecommuni-
cations Act passed both houses of Congress on February 1, 
1996.110 Finally, on February 8, 1996, President Bill Clinton 
signed the Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation 
Act into law, thereby fully incorporating the Communication 
Decency Act. III 
Exon); Edmund L. Andrews, Senate Supports Severe Penalties on Computer Smut, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1995, at AI, D6. The Communications Decency Act amend-
ed 47 U.S.C. § 223, in relevant part, to read as follows: 
47 U.S.C. § 223(a) provides: (a) Whoever - (1) in the 
District of Columbia or in interstate or foreign communi-
cations (A) by means of telecommunications device know-
ingly - (i) makes, creates, or solicits, and (ii) initiates the 
transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, propos-
al, image, or other communication which is obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, or indecent, with intent to annoy, abuse, 
threaten, or harass another person; . . . or (2) knowingly 
permits any telecommunications facility under his control 
to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) 
with the intent that it be used for such activity shall be 
fined not more than $100,000 or imprisoned not more 
than two years, or both. 
141 CONGo REc. S8386 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). 
47 U.S.C. § 223(d) provides: Whoever - (1) knowingly 
within the United States or in foreign communications 
with the United States by means of telecommunications 
device makes or makes available any obscene communica-
tion in any form including any comment, request, sugges-
tion, proposal, or image regardless of whether the maker 
of such communication placed the call or initiated the 
communications; or (2) knowingly permits any telecommu-
nications facility under his control to be used for any 
activity prohibited by subsection (d)(1) with the intent 
that it be used for such activity, shall be fined not more 
than $100,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or 
both. 
141 CONGo REc. S8386 (daily ed. June 14, 1995). 
109. Carolyn Lockhead, Senators Approve Broad Telecom Bill, S.F. CHRONICLE, 
June 16, 1995, at AI, A17. Final vote count was 81 yeas, 18 nays. [d. 
110. Bryan Arules and Albert R. Karr, Telecommunications: Telecom Vote Sig-
nals Competitive Free·for·All, WALL ST. JOURNAL, Feb. 2, 1996, at B1. 
111. Ramon G. McLeod and Reynolds Holding, Clinton OKs Telecom Overhaul, 
S.F. CHRONICLE, February 9, 1996, at AI, A19. 
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III. DISCUSSION 
A. AMENDED 47 U.S.C. § 223 CREATES AN IMPERMISSIBLE 
NATIONAL STANDARD 
Under the commerce clause, Congress has the constitution-
ally backed authority to regulate the dissemination of obscene 
material. 112 However, any federal statute regulating obscene 
material must comport fully with the community standards 
element as set forth in Miller u. California. 113 In prohibiting 
the transmittal of obscene matter over the Internet, however, 
the amended 47 U.S.C. § 223114 fails to take into account the 
structure of that medium as it applies to the concept of com-
munity. Although the concept of community may be ascertain-
able in the context of the telephone,115 the same is not true of 
the Internet. Because the sweeping language set out in the 
amended 47 U.S.C. § 223 fails to take into account the nature 
of the Internet, the provisions contained therein impermissibly 
and unconstitutionally establish a national community stan-
dard in contravention of Miller u. California. 116 
1. The Telephone: Federal Obscenity Regulations Are Feasible 
Because Community Standards Are Discernible 
Title 47 U.S.C. § 223 constitutes the federal obscenity 
statute regulating content over the telephones.ll7 Generally, 
a telephone service provider must take steps to ensure that ex-
pression that would be deemed obscene by a community does 
not reach such community.uB In Sable Communications of 
112. u.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. 
Federal Communications Comm'n, 492 U.S. 115, 124-125 (1989). 
113. Sable at 125 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973». The Miller 
standards, including the contemporary community standards formulation, apply to 
federal legislation. [d. 
114. See supra note 108 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
115. See infra notes 118-27 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
116. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
117. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
118. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 
492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989). Sable operated a dial-a-porn service out of Los Angeles, 
CA., which could be accessed from anywhere in the country by means of dialing a 
long distance toll call to Los Angeles. Sable brought suit seeking equitable relief 
against enforcement of 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) on the basis that the statute created a 
17
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California, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission, the 
Supreme Court held that 47 U.S.C. § 223(b), in its application 
to content transmitted over telephones, did not contravene the 
contemporary community standards requirement of Miller. u9 
In Sable, Sable Communications operated a dial-a-porn service 
out of Los Angeles, California that provided access to callers 
from anywhere in the country by means of a long distance toll 
call. 120 The Court determined that "[t]here is no constitution-
al barrier under Miller to prohibiting communications that are 
obscene in some communities under local standards even 
though they are not obscene in others.,,121 
By being subject to the standards of each and every com-
munity from which calls originated, Sable was, in essence, left 
to tailor the content of their messages to the standards of the 
least-tolerant community in the nation in order to avoid prose-
cution.122 Sable argued that by subjecting the transmitter to 
the standards of the least-tolerant community, Congress had 
established a de facto national standard of obscenity.123 The 
Supreme Court responded to this argument by stating: 
Sable is free to tailor its messages, on a selective 
basis, if it so chooses, to the communities it 
chooses to serve. While Sable may be forced to 
incur some costs in developing and implement-
ing a system for screening the locale of incoming 
calls, there is no constitutional impediment to 
enacting a law which may impose such costs on 
a medium electing to provide these messag-
es. 124 
Therefore, the Court placed the burden upon Sable to develop 
a system to ensure that community standards were main-
tained. 
national standard of obscenity. The Supreme Court determined that 47 U.S.C. § 
223(b) did not unconstitutionally prohibit the interstate transmission of obscene 
material. 
119. [d. 
120. [d. at 117-118. 
121. [d. at 125-26. 
122. [d. at 124. 
123. Sable, 492 U.S. at 124. 
124. [d. at 125. 
18
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The Court recommended methods by which Sable, and 
other message providers, could limit access to their services to 
those communities in which the messages would not be 
deemed obscene. 125 For example, message providers could 
hire operators to screen the locales of incoming calls, or they 
could arrange with telephone companies to automatically 
screen and block calls dialed from restricted communities. 126 
Therefore, because the service provider has the means to deter-
mine the community from which telephone calls are received, 
the burden rests upon the service providers to prevent access 
to calls originating in less-tolerant communities. 127 
2. The Internet: The Amended 47 U.S.C. § 223 Creates a 
National Standard and is Therefore Unconstitutional 
Although the regulation of obscene expressions over the 
telephone survives a national standards challenge because of 
the provider's ability to discern the relevant community's stan-
dards,128 regulation of obscenity on the Internet, as embodied 
in the amended 47 U.S.C. § 223,129 will be unable to survive 
a similar challenge. Due to the inherent inability to predeter-
mine the community's standards into which material is trans-
mitted, a provider will have no other choice but to restrict his 
content to that which is acceptable only in the least-tolerant 
community in the nation. 
The structure of the Internee30 as a communication me-
dium, while similar in utility to the telephone, is vastly differ-
ent in operation.131 A user gains access to a vast network of 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id at 126. 
128. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
129. See supra note 108 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
130. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
131. ED KROL, THE WHOLE INTERNET - USER'S GUIDE & CATALOG, 24 (O'Reilly 
& Assoc., Inc., 2d ed. 1994). 
"When you try to imagine what the Internet is and how 
it operates,it is natural to think of the telephone system. 
After all, they are both electronic, they both let you open 
a connection and transfer information, and the Internet is 
primarily composed of dedicated telephone lines. Unfortu-
nately, this is the wrong picture, and causes many misun-
19
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like-minded users at the press of a button,132 allowing him to 
communicate with as many, or as few, other users as are pres-
ent. 133 The user merely needs to establish a modem connec-
tion with his selected host system to open the world of infor-
mation available in the Internet. 134 The host system connects 
to an estimated 1,313,000 other host systems, permitting the 
user access to all information and interaction occurring within 
the vast Internet network. 135 
Although some of the sexually-oriented material found on-
line may constitute obscene matter in some communities, the 
same material may be characterized merely as indecent in 
another. 136 For example, a sysop 137 in San Francisco may 
establish a BBS providing global access to adult material 
readily available in any San Francisco adult bookstore.138 By 
posting his BBS to general viewing in the Internet, the sysop 
has no involvement in who is seeking the content of his BBS, 
nor any knowledge of their locale. 139 Thousands of viewers 
located anywhere on earth may access a BBS in any twenty-
four hour period. 140 
Id. 
derstandings about how the Internet operates. The tele-
phone network is a circuit switched network. When you 
make a call, you get a piece of the network dedicated to 
you. 
132. Id. at 342. 
133. Id. 
134. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
135. Ted Bunker, Computers & Automation, INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY, Febru-
ary 10, 1993. 
136. Action {or Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1995) 
137. System Operator. 
138. See Philip Elmer·DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 
1995, at 38, 40. "[R]esearchers found nothing that can't be found in specialty mag-
azines or adult bookstores. Most of the material offered by the private BBS servic-
es, in fact, is simply scanned from existing print publications." Id. 
139. J. David Loundy, Would He Know IT When He Downloads IT?, CHICAGO 
DAILY LAw BULLETIN, April 13, 1995, at 6. 
Id. 
[The] process of determining the appropriate community 
would serve to avoid cases . . . where someone calls up a 
system, applies for an account, seeks out, finds and re-
quests transmission of adult material, and then has the 
operator hauled into court for distributing material that is 
obscene to a community thousands of miles away from 
where the defendant is running his business. 
140. See Michael Meyer, A Bad Dream Comes True in Cyberspace: The Germans 
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The analogy between the telephone and the Internet loses 
its effect at this juncture. The rationale of Sable Communica-
tions 141 in placing the burden of conforming dial-a-porn mes-
sages to each individual community's standards is simply not 
feasible on the Internet. 142 Whereas a dial-a-porn provider 
has the technology available to ascertain the community from 
which incoming calls are made, no such technology is available 
to the sysop of a BBS. Since the accessibility to a BBS on 
the Internet is relatively unrestricted, the sysop has no aware-
ness of the communities from which accessors of his service 
originate.143 She cannot be expected to ascertain the obsceni-
ty standards of those communities, and tailor the content of 
his BBS accordingly.l44 Therefore, the Sable challenge applies 
with full force, as sysops will be forced to adopt a national 
standard dictated by the standards of the least-tolerant com-
munity in the nation. 
B. 47 U.S.C. § 223, AS AMENDED, VIOLATES FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROTECTION OF INDECENT EXPRESSION 
Amended 47 U.S.C. § 223 not only creates a national stan-
dard, but in doing so, sweeps within its language speech which 
enjoys First Amendment protection, such as indecent expres-
sions. More importantly, the captive audience doctrine, which 
has been a major ground for the regulation of indecent expres-
sions,l45 simply has no applicability within the context of the 
Internet. l46 U sing a BBS is analogous to using bulletin 
Censor an Online Service and the Rest of Us, Too, NEWSWEEK, January 8, 1996, at 
65. 
141. See supra notes 118-27 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
142. Mike Godwin, Virtual Community Standards . BBS Obscenity Case Raises 
New Legal Issues, REASON MAGAZINE, November, 1994, at 48. 
143. Pamela A. Huelster, Note: Cybersex and Community Standards, 75 B.U.L. 
REV. 865, 870 (1995). 
144. Id. 
145. See Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding 
that there is a compelling governmental interest in protecting high school students 
from an indecent speech at a high school assembly); See FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 
726 (1978); See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir., 
1995). 
146. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 
492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989). " Unlike an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, 
the message received . . . is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an 
unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it." Id. 
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boards found in grocery stores, post offices, schools, businesses, 
or other public places. 147 Just as a bulletin board permits 
members of the community to post information of interest for 
viewing by like-minded individuals, a BBS permits a communi-
ty of like-minded users to view information posted therein, 
ignoring those BBS' which do not appeal to their particular 
interest. 
Yet, there is a significant difference between the grocery 
store "community bulletin board" and an Internet Bulletin 
Board System. In order to utilize the grocery store's bulletin 
board, an individual must be within the geographically defined 
community in which it exists. Therefore, that individual is on 
notice of the community's standards regarding obscene materi-
al by virtue of entering the community. A person may place a 
posting on the grocery store bulletin board which may be offen-
sive and insulting to other community members. These unsus-
pecting viewers may be captive audiences to the content of 
such posting, at least until they recognize the offensive quality 
of the posting and avert their eyes. 148 
However, the structure of the Internet's Bulletin Board 
System poses no such problems. Viewers of the "bulletin 
boards" on the Internet are not immediately subjected to the 
contents contained therein, as are those in the physical com-
munity when reading each individual posting.149 To view the 
contents within a particular BBS, users must take the affirma-
tive step of connecting their computer to the host computer via 
modems.150 The viewer never becomes a captive audience be-
cause the viewer is never forced to view a potentially offensive 
item.15t Users of the Internet who may be offended by the 
material in a particular BBS can simply choose not to connect 
to such BBS, much as they do when walking past an adult 
bookstore or adult movie theatre, without a glance backward. 152 
147. David Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information Systems 
and System Operator Liability, 12 COMPUTER L.J. 101, 103 (1993). 
148. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
149. See David Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information 
Systems and System Operator Liability, 12 COMPUTER L.J., 101, 103 (1993). 
150. Id. 
151. Eugene Volokh, Symposium: Emerging Media Technology and the First 
Amendment: Cheap Speech and What it Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1847 (1995). 
152. Charles Levendosky, Parental Guidance Suggested; Congressional Efforts to 
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A useful analogy can be drawn between the Internet's 
Bulletin Board System and Cable Television.153 Just as a ca-
ble subscriber must make an "affirmative decision to bring 
Cablevision into his home,"154 an Internet user seeking sexu-
ally-oriented material must make an affirmative decision and 
take affirmative steps to obtain such material through one of 
the BBS' providing adult-related material. 155 Furthermore, 
just as a cable subscriber may use monthly program guides to 
determine which programs he wishes to avoid,156 an Internet 
user may use the title of a BBS to avoid the services contain-
ing material objectionable to that user.157 Finally, Cable 
subscribers' concerns with preventing access to the "unpleas-
ant" material available on certain cable stations were alleviat-
ed by providing a free "lockbox" or "parental key.,,158 Most 
commercial online-providers159 already provide "lockout" de-
vices, which enable parents to restrict their children's access to 
undesirable material. 160 
IV. PROPOSAL: PRIVATE ALTERNATIVES TO INTERNET 
REGULATION 
The legislative purpose in amending 47 U.S.C. § 223 to 
prevent minors' exposure to obscene material on the Internet is 
legislate Cyberspace will Create a Decency Monster - and it's Coming After You, 
SUN-SENTINEL, August 6, 1995, at IG. "The audience is the seeker. What appears 
on your computer screen, you requested. You can only blame yourself. You control 
the information you receive." Id. 
153. Cf. Jerry Berman and Daniel J. Weitzner, Symposium: Emerging Media 
Technology and the First Amendment: Abundance and User Control: Renewing the 
Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 
Yale L.J. 1619, 1624 (1995) (comparing and contrasting the access and information 
exchange capabilities of both communication devices.) 
154. Cruz v. Ferre, 755 F.2d 1415, 1420 (11th Cir. 1985). The Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed the granting of declaratory and injunctive relief against a Miami ordi-
nance banning the distribution of obscene and indecent material by cable television 
providers. 
155. Carol Innerst, Anti-porn Bill Makes Waves in Cyberspace; Issue Centers on 
Internet's Status Under Law, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 7, 1995, at A4. 
156. Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1419. 
157. Carol Innerst, Anti-porn Bill Makes Waves in Cyberspace; Issue Centers on 
Internet's Status Under Law, THE WASHINGTON TIMES, March 7, 1995, at A4. 
158. Cruz, 755 F.2d at 1420-1421. 
159. See supra note 2. 
160. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen Near You: Cyberpom, TIME, July 3, 
1995, at 38, 45. 
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a worthy undertaking. However, because the amended statute 
implements a de fado national standard for obscenity,161 its 
application will have a chilling effect on the freedom to engage 
in expression which is protected in many communities 
throughout the United States.162 Furthermore, sysops of BBS' 
transmitting adult-material will be subject to selective enforce-
ment of the statute as written. l63 The statute may be utilized 
by overzealous prosecutors in those communities where the 
standards for obscenity are the least tolerant, converting mate-
rial which may demand First Amendment protection into that 
which possesses none at alL 164 
Because the Internet spans a global market, permitting 
users from every continent to establish a connection at the 
touch of a button, it cannot be treated in the same manner as 
the telephone. 165 The users of the Internet establish their 
own quasi-communities within anyone site.166 Codes of con-
duct are typically enforced by community ridicule, acceptable 
topics for discussion are delineated by the particular online 
community,167 and most commercial online providers post 
161. See supra notes 128-44 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
162. Jube Shiver Jr., House Conferees Seek to Ban 'Indecent' Internet Material, 
Los ANGELES TIMES, December 7, 1995, at AI. 
163. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
164. BOB WOODWARD & SCOT!' ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN - INSIDE THE SU-
PREME COURT, p.253, Simon & Schuster, 1979. 
A few weeks later [following the Court's decision in Paris 
Adult Theatre], an Albemarle County, Virginia, prosecutor 
announced that he would prosecute anyone selling Playboy 
magazine on local newsstands. The magazine violated 
community standards in Charlottesville, home of the Uni-
versity of Virginia . . . When the Chief [Burger, C.J.] 
read a news story on the prosecutor's action, he immedi-
ately jotted a memo to the conference. He had never 
intended to ban Playboy, he insisted. His opinion was 
clear on that point. 
Id. See also ACLU, Other Groups File Brief Appeal of BBS Operator, THE ENTER-
TAINMENT LITIGATION REPORTER, August 15, 1995. 
165. EDWARD A. CAVAZOS & GAVINO MORIN, CYBERSPACE AND THE LAW: YOUR 
RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN THE ON-LINE WORLD, 94 (1994). "Cyberspace is, after all, a 
global community that often pays little attention to the boundaries and borders of 
the physical world." Id. 
166. Ramon G. Macleod, The Rules of Netiquette: Minding Your Manners on the 
Net, S.F. CHRONICLE, March 6, 1996, at AI, A10. 
167. Id. 
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terms of service upon signing on with that provider.16s There-
fore, in satisfying the elements of the Miller test, the relevant 
community's standards must be those of the Internet communi-
ty.169 
The protection of First Amendment rights demands that a 
legislature enact regulations that are narrowly tailored to 
achieve a substantial governmental interest. 170 With respect 
to the indecency provisions embodied within amended 47 
U.S.C. § 223, several alternatives exist which, if adopted, 
would simultaneously accomplish the government's substantial 
interest in preventing exposure of offensive material to chil-
dren, while maintaining First Amendment protections. 171 
These alternative measures include software with built-in 
"filter" products and a self-imposed BBS rating system.172 
The technology for software programs designed to "filter" 
out undesirable Internet sites already exists. 173 In fact, sever-
al types of software that filter undesirable Internet sites are 
currently available on the market. These software products 
preclude exposure to such Internet sites. 174 The products 
function in several ways to filter the undesired sites from a 
users' personal computer.175 One product allows the user to 
customize the program to filter sites containing words or 
phrases that the user may find inappropriate for children. 176 
Another software product automatically filters out approxi-
mately sixteen hundred sites deemed objectionable by the 
168. Id. 
169. J. David Loundy, Would He Know IT When He Downloads IT?, CHICAGO 
DAILY LAw BULLETIN, April 13, 1995, at 6, citing to Lance Rose, author of 
NETLAW. "[T]he first test a court should apply is to look and see if there is a 
relevant on-line community whose standards should be applied . . . " Id. 
170. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989) (discussing the re-
quirement that a regulation be narrowly tailored to achieve a substantial, content-
neutral governmental purpose). 
171. Industry Task Force to Study Ways to Control Obscenity on Computer Sys-
tems, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES, June 29, 1995, Sec. A, p.125. 
172. Id. 
173. See Doug Abrahms, Exon Move on Internet Porn Grabs Lawmakers, THE 
WASHINGTON TIMES, July 19, 1995, at B7. 
174. Joe Abernathy, Net Censorship: Alternatives Gain Momentum, PC WORLD, 
September, 1995, at 54. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
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developers,177 while providing a password device enabling an 
adult to access such material. 178 Parents who are concerned 
about the potential for their children to stumble upon adult-
content material can easily purchase, install, and in some 
cases customize these preventive products. 179 Similarly, most 
major online providers180 already include parental control de-
vices which permit parents to block those areas which they do 
not want their children to access. 181 In fact, major online pro-
viders are currently expanding the range of options available 
to parents to block their children's access to undesired materi-
al. 182 
Another less restrictive alternative to the amended 47 
U.S.C. § 223 is a self-imposed rating system. l83 Similar to the 
rating system utilized by the motion picture industry/54 an 
Internet rating system delineates the content of Internet sites 
based upon their theme and language. l85 Under this system, 
every content provider on the Internet would adhere to a pre-
arranged rating guideline and rate the content of his or her 
site accordingly.l86 Parents and schools would be immediately 
advised as to the character of the content of a particular 
Internet site187 and could respond accordingly with their filter 
software. 188 
177. Id. 
178. Charles Levendosky, Parental Guidance Suggested; Congressional Efforts to 
Legislate Cyberspace will Create a Decency Monster - and it's Coming After You, 
SUN-SENTINEL, August 6, 1995, at lG. 
179. Ellis Booker, What a Tangled Web We Weave, COMPUTERWORLD, July 31, 
1995, at 54. 
180. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
181. Doug Abrahms, Exon Move on Internet Porn Grabs Lawmakers, THE WASH-
INGTON TIMES, July 19, 1995, at B7. 
182. Ellis Booker, What a Tangled Web We Weave, COMPUTERWORLD, July 31, 
1995, at 54. 
183. Joe Abernathy, Net Censorship: Alternatives Gain Momentum, PC WORLD, 
September, 1995, at 54. 
184. Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F.Supp. 1328, app.I (W.D. Mich., 1983). Appendix I 
to Swope sets forth the reasons and purposes behind the Movie Picture Association 
of America's ("MPAA") adaptation of a self-imposed rating Sy8tem for all movies. 
185. See Joe Abernathy, Net Censorship: Alternatives Gain Momentum, PC 
WORLD, September, 1995, at 54. 
186. Id. 
187. See Swope v. Lubbers, 560 F.Supp. 1328, app.l (W.D. Mich., 1983). "The 
only objective of the ratings is to advise the parent in advance so he or she may 
determine the ossible suitability or unsuitability of viewing by children." Id. at 
1337. 
188. Joe Abernathy, Net Censorship: Alternatives Gain Momentum, PC WORLD, 
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The essence of each of the above-proposed alternatives is 
the notion that responsibility and control over one's children 
must reside with parents. 189 The legislature must resist as-
suming a parental role, thereby impinging upon First Amend-
ment rights. 190 The role of the parent must not be usurped by 
the government, especially when the teachings of morality are 
involved. 191 
v. CONCLUSION 
This comment has argued that the amended Title 47 
U.S.C. § 223, regulating the transmission of obscene material 
over the Internet, is unconstitutional because application of the 
Miller test requires that a community standard dictate what 
constitutes obscene material. 192 Because the Internet, by its 
very nature, blurs traditional concepts of community, the Mill-
er test proves to be inapplicable with respect to a community 
standard. Sweeping language that binds the entire country to 
September, 1995, at 54. 
189. Id. at 54; Doug Abrahms, Exon Move on Internet Porn Grabs Lawmakers, 
THE WASHINGTON TIMES, July 19, 1995, at B7; Elizabeth Corcoran, Researchers 
Try to Set Standards; Technology Tackles Ways to Block Out Information, THE 
WASHINGTON POST, October 30, 1995, at F15; Philip Elmer-DeWitt, On a Screen 
Near You: Cyberporn, TIME, July 3, 1995, at 38; J. David Loundy, Would He Know 
IT When He Downloads IT?, CHICAGO DAILY LAw BULLETIN, April 13, 1995, at 6. 
190. Nat HentotT, Can Gingrich Rescue Cyberspace?, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 1, 
1995, at B6, quoting Senator Leahy (D-Vt.): 
Id. 
Empowering parents to manage - with technology under 
their control - what the kids access over the Internet is 
far preferable to bills . . . government regulation of the 
content of all computer and telephone communications, 
even private communications, in violation of the First 
Amendment is not the answer - it is merely a knee-jerk 
response. 
191. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 72 (1973) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting). 
Id. 
As a parent or a priest or as a teacher I would have no 
compunction in edging my children or wards away from 
the books and movies that did no more than excite man's 
base instincts. But I never supposed that government was 
permitted to sit in judgment on one's tastes or beliefs -
save as they involved action within the reach of the p0-
lice power of government. 
192. See supra notes 58-69 and accompanying text for further discussion. 
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the standards of the least-tolerant community must be avoid-
ed.193 Rather than enlarging existing telecommunications 
statutes regulating the transmission of obscene material, Con-
gress should concentrate its efforts at devising a statute which 
reflects the nature of the medium being regulated. 
This comment has also argued that Title 47 U.S.C. § 223, 
as amended, sweeps within its language a non-captive audi-
ence, and therefore fails to narrowly acieve the substantial 
governmental interest of protecting children from indecent 
material. Congress must consider the alternative means avail-
able to accomplishing the desired result of preventing dissemi-
nation of adult-material to children, while securing the right 
for adults to have access to material that is protected within 
their communities. 
Andrew Spett" 
193. See Robert F. Goldman, Note: Put Another Log on the Fire, There's a Chill 
on the Internet: the Effect of Applying Current Anti-obscenity Laws to Online Com-
munications, 9 GAo L. REv_ 1075, 1119 (1995). 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1996. I'd like to take this 
opportunity to thank both of my editors, Wendy Wilbanks and Robert Arnold, for 
their invaluable assistance and ideas, as well as their seemingly unending pa-
tience. 
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